@Birger blocking military resupplies to Ukraine would require all of the following:

1. Capture Mariupol blocking off the land bridge

2. Destroy the Kerch bridge

3. Establish naval superiority to prevent resupplies by sea

4. Destroy the airport to prevent resupply by air

Especially #3 is extremely unlikely to happen so we can be certain that Ukraine will have to face Russia without the benefit of having cut-off their military supply chains.

@NikitaSokolsky counter

1. I think it is likely to happen as the mud disappears and Ukraine gets the mobility advantage (they can pick where they want to strike faster than Russia can respond).

2. The Kerch Bridge has already been hit, and every day they get better equipment. If it is needed, it is very likely they will get something to destroy it.

3. They don't need naval superiority to disrupt shipping as there are not that many ships, and they are not easy to replace. And even if they don't, it is not easy to move millions of shells and liters of fuel by ferry.

4. It is truly impossible to supply any front with air supply longer than a day or two, and the cost alone would bankrupt the state.

nr.3 is not necessary as they are interested in denial, not supplying their own troops.

@Birger Russia loses Crimea this year only if there is a total collapse in the Russian military and/or a political crisis of sufficient severity that causes the Russian state to be incapable of issuing commands.

@Birger I agree this is undervalued, just bought some YES shares. It's not that I believe that it will resolve to YES. I'm just quite sure the value will be much higher in several months, so I believe it's a profitable move :-)

@NikitaSokolsky no "land bridge", no Kerch bridge, how are you gonna resupply Crimea?

@nickten Kerch bridge is still up and running. There's also ships and planes. I support Ukraine but objectively speaking they're not taking back Crimea this year.

@NikitaSokolsky I would put the odds >1% (want to make a side-bet @ 100:1 odds?) but yeah, this would require a collapse of the Russian war effort (even Putin's ouster might not end the stalemate on this front)

@NikitaSokolsky I would say around 2%. The geography of the Crimean peninsula is extremely defendable. Ukraine lacks the air and sea forces necessary to mount a credible retaking, they would have to mount a traditional land invasion. But Crimea has a tiny land connection to the mainland which is easily defendable. Ukraine would have to throw bodies at the Isthmus of Perekop which would cause a very high number of casualties

@AlQuinn would prefer making a side bet in cash against someone on the bullish end, as that would be way more profitable for me.

@NikitaSokolsky What odds will you give me. People here can vouch that I'm good for it.

@NathanpmYoung 1:15 odds but I don't have anyone vouching for me so I think it might not work logistically.

@NikitaSokolsky Naaah I trust you. I'll bet $10 you bet $150?

@NathanpmYoung Sounds good. Let's Venmo/Paypal/Zelle on Jan 1st 2024.

@NathanpmYoung I'm probably dumb, but how are you getting such a specific percentage? Is it based on math from your other two numbers, or is it just vibes?

@NathanpmYoung My critique takes the form of a NO limit order at 40%.

@NathanpmYoung

1) Western government's would probably push against taking pre-2022 territories, especially Crimea.

2) AFAIK most weapon aid from western governments is going to arrive towards the end of this year.

This whole market is crazily optimistic, my chances of Crimea going back to Ukraine this year is 5%

@Gabrielle It's based on some back of the envelope calcs. But also I don't think 2sf is particularly specific. If I thought 40 was low and 45 was high I might say 42 off the top of my head. At that point saying 40 or 45 would be inaccurate (though you might fairly say that I probably don't have 40 different levels of well calibrated confidence between 0 and 1 and you'd be right)

@NathanpmYoung if you want to make a real money bet at 33% chance (2 to 1 odds), let me know.

My real odds right now are around 20ish% and are concentrated (just over half) in worlds where the US basically joins Ukraine to invade Crimea, nearly launching a large war.

@NathanpmYoung Odds of taking Crimea being >50% after taking Zaporizhia seems highly mistaken IMO.

I think the odds they make attempt to a push INTO Crimea may be less then 50%, but you have to half that again to say the odds of successfully taking the majority of Crimea. Putin will likely wager much more protecting Crimea then any part of Ukraine they've captured so far.

@JonathanRay Risk free rate doesn't work that way on Manifold because of loans - you get most of your investment loaned back within several months, by 1 year you get almost all your capital back.

Also, that logic doesn't make it profitable to buy YES up to 10%... If you believe the true odds are 5%, then you lose mana in expectation, and you also lock up capital for a year! If the discount rate for mana were 5%, that would mean that you need the price to be 5% lower or higher than your true odds before it's worth it to invest.

Oh nvm, you are selling your NO position, so ignore my last comment. First comment still applies in general, but there are many situations where it certainly makes sense to sell to get the capital back. In this case, if you want to unload your shares to me I'd be happy to buy them.

@Matto442 big fields versus a fortified penisula used as a naval base.

@CromlynGames Yeah, I'm saying I think the gap should be larger than it was when I bet

@DouglasCampbell I think the official White House position on this has evolved in the last 30-45 days to more accepting of the inevitability of a Crimea offensive this year. If they can blow the bridge completely its on...

@BTE oh, I think they'll try very hard to hit the bridge again for sure after it's put back in operation in March. now they can strike anywhere on the land bridge, which should make the eastern half of Kherson at least somewhat challenging to supply.

@BTE Interesting. Links? I didnt' read this Op-Ed but the reporting on it suggested Blinken did not support taking Crimea. https://twitter.com/johnstanly/status/1620758592361222146

@DouglasCampbell I am sympathetic to that take. There is not a single Russian politico (from what I understand) who thinks Crimea is anything other than Russian. Even Navalny. Ukraine could probably take it but Putin would be forced by Russians to take it back at all costs which takes tactical nukes out of the realm of "is Putin going to escalate" and into the nightmare of "is Putin going to resist the demands of Russians that he escalate"? Crimea could well be the honeypot...

@BTE Did someone say honey?

@BTE For me, I think it is probably not super wise of Ukraine to retake Crimea. It is full of Russians at this point. It's a red line for Putin. If Ukraine takes it back Russia must attack it again in the future. Retaking it will also split the European allies. Poland & the Baltics might be on board but it's unlikely Germany or France would be as enthusiastic. The Ukrainians could threaten Crimea but offer to recognize it and maybe even give it water in return for peace and the ability to join the EU. That's an ideal scenario.

@DouglasCampbell In a better world maybe Crimea would become independent.

@thebest33 300+? Self-plug: free mana at

that prediction is from dec 31. newer sources (https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/27/world/ukraine-tanks-western-allies-intl-hnk/index.html#:~:text=This%20week%2C%20several%20Western%20nations,the%20near%20and%20long%20terms.) give numbers 300 and up (321 to be precise).

my bad read the closing date wrong lmao but still news sources say 321 wil be the case. although CNN is the only link i provided multiple sources say this has been decided

@thebest33 I expect the promises to come through, mostly, maybe even get some extra!

Still, for now, the tanks are not yet delivered. Whether more or less...

@NathanpmYoung with conscription, Russia is going to have a significant numbers advantage in 2023. But more importantly, the logistical/geographical realities of retaking Crimea are extremely difficult. Ukraine does not have a real navy with which to project power into Crimea, they don't have anywhere near enough aircraft, and a land assault would have to go through the tiny and easily defensible bottleneck Isthmus of Perekop. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isthmus_of_Perekop

@PS this market is not limited to military force.

@CromlynGames Definitely true. However, if Russia is unlikely to be prepared to give Crimea due to a military defeat, it's presumably also unlikely to give it up without one. I would guess that even regime change tomorrow wouldn't result in Crimea being returned to Ukraine within the year.

@MartinModrak In addition, Crimea is a much higher priority for Russia than even Donetsk/Luhansk. It is considered more important emotionally, strategically and from a PR/public opinion point of view.

@MartinModrak Do you think that the new tanks will make a difference here?

@NathanpmYoung I largely buy @MartinModrak's take, & I think that tanks in the low numbers pledged so far are probably more powerful as a statement that US/UK/Germany/Poland are in this for the long run than as actual military asset.

@NathanpmYoung I am no military expert. From what I've heard from analysts I trust, tanks are just one (although likely somewhat more important) component of a vast array of needs for active offensive operations. Offensive capabilities will also be limited by e.g. lack of artillery (and likely also tank) ammo or barrel life and generally maintanence and spare parts availability. To me, the announced tanks seem as an incremental rather than revolutionary change and thus IMHO shouldn't move the assesment much.

@MartinModrak They're fighting Russia, not a capable military, it's not like Russia itself is full of these weaponry too.

@MP I don't think Russians are significantly lacking in tanks at the moment. The two major successful offensives Ukraine had were Kharkiv, where Russian forces were completely overextended, and Kherson, which was hard to defend due to the geography. I certainly hope there will be more Ukrainian successes, but I don't think they will come easily, certainly not in Crimea which has been under Russian control for almost a decade and should be well fortified by now.

@Ajuc00 Losing Crimea would very likely be the end of Putin (~90% sure). Getting Crimea back was the thing that got his rating back on track in 2014, since a lot of the population was considering it "a historical injustice being fixed", so losing it would be a fatal blow to his "strong man in charge who gets things done" appeal. He might risk using tactical nuclear weapons to defend Crimea.

My point being is that currently it seems to be that either this market is too high at 32%, or "Putin stays in power" markets are too high:

@theservy I am 50/50 about Putin losing power by end of 2023 and I disagree about the strict relationship between these. What's your mechanism for putin losing power if russia loses Crimea? Notice the definition "over 50% of if is occupied by ukrainian forces as of close date".

@Ajuc00 In my model, Putin cares about popular support (because he fears mass protests, a coup, etc.). The best explanation for why he started this war that I know of:

- His ratings were slowly falling, and people were no longer that impressed with "restoring historical justice" by taking Crimea in 2014. He was afraid for his future (presidential election in 2024, and possible mass protests if he fakes the results too much).

- Last time with Crimea, it went fantastic. So he wanted a quick campaign, to gain the support back by showcasing himself as a strong leader who is winning the geopolitics game, even if local things are mediocre.

Now, he wants to end this war with something that can be presented to the people as a success by the government media. "Liberating" Luganskaya oblast, and still holding Crimea would probably be enough if Ukraine accepted peace with such conditions. Every military action (like, bombing civilian infrastructure) has the goal of forcing Ukraine to consider negotiations.

Losing Crimea is not acceptable to his goal. If that happens, unless he has a reasonable chance of recapturing it very shortly, I mostly expect him to cut losses, appoint a successor (like Yeltsin did), and hope that the successor holds his word, so Putin can die of old age in solitude. Though, he understands that so he will do whatever it takes to avoid losing Crimea in the first place, including sacrificing a shit-ton of soldiers and/or using tactical nukes.

@theservy russia is a totalitarian dictatorship, with the population trained for centuries to be passive and go along. Putin don't need to care about support, in fact he is repeatedly sacrificing popular support to get more toys in Ukraine, not the other way around. See the mobilization for one example, but there are more policies that do this trade.

When Putin loses power it will be because FSB decided somebody else will serve their interests better (just like they did with replacing Yeltsin with Putin in 2000), not because of popular support figures going down. In some ways a leader with worse popular support can be beneficial to FSB (because it means they have more influence and less obstacles to their power).

So - if the war is lost - weak putin might be just what FSB needed to get the reforms done. If the war is won and putin is doing cleansings in the army and security services - FSB might need to replace him despite the victory. There are factors going both ways there.

Kremlinology is very counterintuitive, because any coup that has a chance of working is by definition a surprise to the ruler. So it must be a surprise to foreign observers.

As for Ukraine accepting territorial concessions to Russia - no way this happens when everybody in Ukraine thinks they are winning (as is the case now). Ukraine is ultimately a democracy with a very strong low-level activism and participation. They don't do so well with corruption, but they are very good at replacing governments that disappointed them. Succeeded 2 times in last 20 years. In contrast to Putin - Zelensky can't ignore popular support, so he won't accept any concessions as long as Ukrainians have a chance. And right now they all think they are winning this no problem.

@Ajuc00 There are hints that make me think that he cares. Mobilisation is "partial", downplayed by the govt media, and was introduced very late, only when it became absolutely obvious that without it the only outcome is a lost war. A lost war is way worse then "partial" mobilisation, so the tradeoff seem consistent with him maximizing popular support to stay in power. Surely, if he didn't care about public opinion, the correct move would have been to start mobilisation in April, once it became clear that the initial plan is doomed beyond salvation.

After reading your replies, I think I should update my estimate of "Putin stays in power for at least one more year after Crimea is lost" to consider it to be more likely, thanks.

Would you bet in the market below I just created? What is your estimate for its pprobability?

@theservy "Losing Crimea would very likely be the end of Putin (~90% sure)."
That's a very strong assertion. I just made a market for it

@theservy and @ahalekelly - The odds both feel right, and they can be reconciled if there's a bit of slippage in the series of events.
1) Russia looses control of Crimea (but tries to get it back for months)
2) Loss of Crimea impacts Putin's rep, but the state apparatus is so corrupt and reliant on status quo the election returns him anyway
3) Loss of Crimea forces Putin out, but it's after the election and more of a putsch/handover kind of deal, and due to the lag, occurs after 2024

@BenjaminIkuta Not looking likely huh. Winter seems to have really slowed things down a lot, which is understandable.