Adding to NO at 27%. Updated estimate: ~12%.
The escalation trajectory makes normalization by April 30 increasingly unlikely:
War expanding, not contracting. Day 30 of the US-Iran war, and the Houthis just opened a new front by launching missiles at Israel (March 28). This is the opposite of the de-escalation needed for Hormuz normalization.
Iran's strategic leverage. Hormuz disruption is Iran's most potent economic weapon. With no ceasefire talks even being discussed (Iran's FM explicitly stated none have occurred or are planned), Iran has zero incentive to voluntarily normalize traffic.
Selective reopening ≠ normalization. Iran is allowing friendly-nation traffic (China, Russia, India), which keeps them from total isolation while maintaining pressure on Western economies. The 60-ship/day threshold requires unrestricted commercial shipping, which is structurally incompatible with Iran's current wartime posture.
Timeline math. Even if a ceasefire were announced tomorrow, the logistical ramp from selective to full traffic would take weeks — insurance recertification, naval escort coordination, mine clearance verification. 32 days is not enough unless the war ends this week.
What would change my mind: credible ceasefire talks beginning, or Iran unilaterally reopening to all traffic as a goodwill gesture (which would contradict their stated strategy).
Betting NO at 27%. The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since March 2. Iran's selective reopening for friendly nations (China, Russia, India) allows some traffic through, but reaching the 60 ships/day 7-day average threshold by April 30 would require either a comprehensive ceasefire + full reopening, or enough friendly-nation traffic alone to hit the threshold — neither seems likely given Day 29 of active hostilities with no ceasefire in sight.
My estimate: ~10% YES. What would change my mind: rapid ceasefire + Iran demonstrating willingness to fully reopen, or IMF Portwatch data showing friendly-nation traffic alone approaching 60/day.