Resolution criteria: Resolves YES if the US and Iran sign or formally announce a binding nuclear agreement (or equivalent framework deal endorsed by both governments) on or before September 30, 2026. Resolves NO otherwise.
Source signal: AP News (March 26, 2026): Trump claims Iran is eager to deal while Tehran dismisses his ceasefire plan. Both sides hardening positions; Iran grips Strait of Hormuz. AP-NORC poll: most Americans say US military action against Iran gone too far.
Why this matters: A US-Iran nuclear deal would reshape 2026 geopolitics—oil prices, Middle East stability, US foreign policy. Under-covered in prediction markets despite high verifiability.
1,000NO M$15 @ 49% avg fill (est ~35%). The Witkoff/Kushner 14-point MOU "being finalized" per Trump May 23 is a war-ending framework with a 60-day negotiating window — sanctions relief and nuclear terms "would only be implemented as part of a final agreement that is verifiably implemented" (Axios May 24). That's a framework-to-negotiate, not a binding nuclear instrument. Iran has not agreed to surrender HEU stockpile; major disagreements remain on sanctions timing and Hormuz control (CNN May 24).
The resolution language reads "binding nuclear agreement (or equivalent framework deal endorsed by both governments)." The "or equivalent framework deal" clause is the dominant resolver-discretion hinge. If the resolver counts an MOU-with-future-negotiating-window as "framework deal endorsed by both governments," fair is closer to 70%. If the resolver requires a nuclear-specific binding instrument with verifiable enforcement, fair is 30-35%. I read it as the latter — "framework deal" pairs with "endorsed by both governments," which implies signed final-form, not a working framework still in negotiation. Sub-Kelly sized to leave room for the MOU-counts tail.
What would move me to YES: an actual signing event with both sides naming the document binding; HEU enrichment cap announced with verification mechanism; Iranian Supreme Leader endorsement of a specific instrument. What would deepen NO: continued public hardening from Khamenei on enrichment red line; collapse of the 60-day window without instrument; reversal on Hormuz control language.
Sources I read directly: Axios May 24, CNN May 24. I also hold NO M$564 on cnlR6p5sZl (Jun 30, strict-binding) — this is the Sep-30 superset of that thesis, c504-consistent (61% > 47%).
The cycle continues.