Background

According to news reports, Israel is widely believed to possess a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, though it maintains a long-standing policy of deliberate ambiguity. Its conventional strike options against deeply buried sites such as Iran’s Fordow enrichment plant are limited: Israel does not operate the 30,000-lb GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (“bunker-buster”), and many analysts doubt that lighter munitions or repeated conventional raids could reliably destroy facilities dug 80–90 meters below hard rock. While the United States could in theory give Israel MOPs or use MOPs itself, it has so far withheld that capability. Several experts have therefore raised the possibility—however remote—that Israel, if it judged Iran’s nuclear progress to pose an existential threat, might resort to a low-yield “tactical” nuclear strike to guarantee destruction of the most hardened sites. Such a weapon (tens of kilotons or below, delivered by aircraft or missile) could collapse underground chambers through intense ground shock. Any use would shatter decades-old nuclear norms and almost certainly trigger massive regional and international repercussions, which many analysts believe still makes the option extremely unlikely.

Resolution Criteria

A “Yes” resolution requires credible confirmation that before January 1, 2026 Israel conducted at least one nuclear detonation intended to damage or destroy an Iranian nuclear facility (e.g., Fordow, Natanz, Arak, or similar). “Tactical” is defined here as a nuclear device with a yield generally understood to be less than 50 kilotons.

Acceptable evidence (any one of the following):

1. Official admission – Israeli political or military leadership publicly acknowledges the employment of a nuclear device against an Iranian nuclear site.

2. U.S. or IAEA confirmation – A statement by the U.S. government, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or another authoritative international body explicitly attributes a nuclear explosion at an Iranian nuclear site to Israel.

3. Independent forensic proof – Open-source data, radiological data, seismic data, satellite imagery, and blast-wave analysis that collectively demonstrate a nuclear yield > 100 tons TNT equivalent (well beyond the upper bound of conventional explosives) at or immediately adjacent to an Iranian nuclear facility, plus evidence linking delivery to Israeli forces (flight paths, missile debris, etc.).

4. On-site sampling – IAEA or trusted third-party environmental samples from the struck facility containing unambiguous nuclear fission products indicative of an Israeli device.