You can submit any person/character/concept (shortened to p/c/c for the rest of the description), as well as a link / short phrase to give traders some context. If other people trade on your submission, you'll get mana off of their transaction fees.
I may N/A options for quality control, or edit them to provide a more neutral summary.
You can help us in resolving options by spending at least 1 mana on each person/character/concept you have an opinion on. Buy YES if you think it's overrated, and NO if you think it's underrated.
As a trader, you should buy any amount of YES in p/c/c you think are overrated, buy any amount of NO in p/c/c you think are underrated. The amount of shares doesn't matter for the resolution, one share of yes is one vote and one hundred shares of yes is also one vote.
The market will close every Sunday at circa Noon London time. I will then check the positions tab on options that have been submitted.
If there is a clear majority of YES holders, the option resolves YES. If there is a clear majority of NO holders, the option resolves NO. If it's very close and votes are still coming in, the option will remain un-resolved. The market will then re-open for new submissions, with a new close date the next week. This continues as long as I think the market is worth running. It does not matter what % the market is at, and bots holding a position are also counted. In a tie, the option will not resolve that day. Options may resolve in between weeks if they are from a previous week and the scales are clearly tilted enough.
Heavily inspired from @Bayesian's excellent market, Left-Wing or Right-Wing? Which person/character/concept will Manifold think are "Right-Wing" this week?
and from @NicoDelon's excellent market Over (yes)/underrated (no) intellectuals according to Manifold [resolves to poll]
1,000
3.00Thanks all @traders ! I'm running this market for at least one more week. Options that were clear enough have been resolved, I added a few new ones. Feel free to make your additions as well !
Bump !
Sorry for the inactivity, I’ll come back here on Sunday. I’ll resolve all options where the decision is pretty clear, then depending on the activity of this market in the following days, I’ll either add some more options for next week, or find a way to completely close it
@TheAllMemeingEye Sorry, it underwent hibernation due to a combination of too few trade happening, too few options being added, and me not being as active here as I used to
@TrickyDuck Woops
Options weren’t clear enough for the previous resolution wave, so I let them. Seems I didn’t set up the new close date properly which made it close sooner than it should. I reopened trades, will resolve some options tomorrow and will push the automatic close date very far away so that it doesn’t happen again.
@TheAllMemeingEye Would you like to elaborate what you’re meaning by compounding societal coordination problems ? I’m not sure I understand
@Mich Extract from Inadequate Equilibria by Eliezer Yudkowsky
Chapter 3: Moloch’s Toolbox | Inadequate Equilibria (equilibriabook.com)
CECIE: I’ll now introduce the concept of a signaling equilibrium.
To paraphrase a commenter on Slate Star Codex: suppose that there’s a magical tower that only people with IQs of at least 100 and some amount of conscientiousness can enter, and this magical tower slices four years off your lifespan. The natural next thing that happens is that employers start to prefer prospective employees who have proved they can enter the tower, and employers offer these employees higher salaries, or even make entering the tower a condition of being employed at all.5
VISITOR: Hold on. There must be less expensive ways of testing intelligence and conscientiousness than sacrificing four years of your lifespan to a magical tower.
CECIE: Let’s not go into that right now. For now, just take as an exogenous fact that employers can’t get all of the information they want by other channels.
VISITOR: But—
CECIE: Anyway: the natural next thing that happens is that employers start to demand that prospective employees show a certificate saying that they’ve been inside the tower. This makes everyone want to go to the tower, which enables somebody to set up a fence around the tower and charge hundreds of thousands of dollars to let people in.6
VISITOR: But—
CECIE: Now, fortunately, after Tower One is established and has been running for a while, somebody tries to set up a competing magical tower, Tower Two, that also drains four years of life but charges less money to enter.
VISITOR: … You’re solving the wrong problem.
CECIE: Unfortunately, there’s a subtle way in which this competing Tower Two is hampered by the same kind of lock-in that prevents a jump from Craigslist to Danslist. Initially, all of the smartest people headed to Tower One. Since Tower One had limited room, it started discriminating further among its entrants, only taking the ones that have IQs above the minimum, or who are good at athletics or have rich parents or something. So when Tower Two comes along, the employers still prefer employees from Tower One, which has a more famous reputation. So the smartest people still prefer to apply to Tower One, even though it costs more money. This stabilizes Tower One’s reputation as being the place where the smartest people go.
In other words, the signaling equilibrium is a two-factor market in which the stable point, Tower One, is cemented in place by the individually best choices of two different parts of the system. Employers prefer Tower One because it’s where the smartest people go. Smart employees prefer Tower One because employers will pay them more for going there. If you try dissenting from the system unilaterally, without everyone switching at the same time, then as an employer you end up hiring the less-qualified people from Tower Two, or as an employee, you end up with lower salary offers after you go to Tower Two. So the system is stable as a matter of individual incentives, and stays in place. If you try to set up a cheaper alternative to the whole Tower system, the default thing that happens to you is that people who couldn’t handle the Towers try to go through your new system, and it acquires a reputation for non-prestigious weirdness and incompetence.
@TheAllMemeingEye oh interesting
Not sure I really agree, I don’t think the four years are taken away, and magical towers in France usually don’t charge thousands (so they don’t have legacy admissions either, and there’s not the same hype about athletics. I could think about some higher education establishments in France that I think are waaaay overrated but that’s not the ones you’d think about and I don’t think the whole set is overrated)
@TheAllMemeingEye Maybe haha
Although I think fees are not managed the same way for french nationals and for international students. But it’s possible to get a scholarship. You’d have had to learn french though. Or to deal with how french people are on average terrible at english
Ftr I don't think the pivot is good, I just think it's technically underrated because people are acting as if it's even worse than it is e.g. the self-immolation
@traders first wawe has resolved, some options are waiting for more input, new options can be added for this week
New market ! And you can add options :)
Was first part of my plan to stay in Masters ; since trader bonuses no longer count for leagues, that won't do me much good but hey, I may blow up all Mana and quit soon, might as well have fun along the way !