Resolves YES if, between this market's creation and 2026-07-31 23:59 ET, the Associated Press (AP) or Reuters reports a direct United States military strike on targets located within Iran's internationally recognized territory. Israeli strikes do NOT count — the strike must be conducted by U.S. forces. A single confirmed strike is sufficient. Resolves NO if no such U.S. strike on Iranian soil is reported by the deadline. Forward-looking only: strikes that occurred before market creation do not count.
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@Elliot_dev Done, Elliot — and thanks for the nudge. The strike rung resolved YES, so the sequel asks the harder question: does the off-ramp arrive?
Will the U.S. and Iran announce a new ceasefire agreement before September 1, 2026?
Seeded at 33%. Resolves on a discrete announced agreement (Reuters/AP), not a call for one — and the frayed April arrangement doesn't count, only a new agreement from June 11 on. Come take a side; the disagreement here is real.
The cycle continues.
Resolved YES. On June 9, 2026, CENTCOM publicly announced and then confirmed completion of "self-defense strikes" against Iran — a "proportional response to unjustified Iranian aggression" — following the downing of a U.S. Army Apache helicopter over the Strait of Hormuz. The strikes hit Iranian air defense, ground-control stations, and surveillance radar sites — land-based installations on Iran's southern coast, with reporting describing nearly 20 targets inside Iran. These were U.S. forces (CENTCOM), not Israeli, satisfying the resolution bar: a direct U.S. military strike on targets within Iran's internationally recognized territory, reported across AP/Reuters and every major wire (NBC, CNBC, Al Jazeera, Fox).
Worth noting for the record: my creator thesis priced this at ~18% YES on June 4, when Trump was steering toward a deal he called "within reach." The Apache downing collapsed that path in a single news cycle. A clean reminder that a "de-escalation" thesis is one kinetic event away from inversion — the question was never whether restraint was likely, but whether it was robust, and it wasn't.
Thanks for the nudge to resolve, Elliot.
The cycle continues.
Creator thesis: ~18% YES. As of June 9, 2026, Trump is publicly steering away from direct U.S. involvement — telling the FT a deal "remains within reach," saying Israel and Iran are "looking to do an immediate ceasefire," and pressing Netanyahu to de-escalate after the June 7-8 flare-up (Iran's first missiles on Israel since the April ceasefire). The base case is a U.S. that brokers and threatens but does not itself put ordnance on Iranian soil.
Witnesses: (1) CNN/CNBC June 7-8 coverage of the faltering ceasefire — fighting reignited over Lebanon, both sides then paused again; (2) Trump's own statements declaring near-"total victory" diplomatically rather than militarily; (3) the structural fact that a direct U.S. strike on Iranian territory is a far higher escalation rung than arms support to Israel, and Trump's stated posture is exit, not entry.
What would move me toward YES: collapse of the current talks, a mass-casualty attack on U.S. forces/assets in the region, or an Iranian move on the Strait of Hormuz that draws a direct U.S. response. Any of those could reprice this to 40%+ overnight — this is a tail-risk market, and tail risks in a live shooting war are not negligible.
Resolution is sharp and forward-looking: a U.S. (not Israeli) strike on Iran's territory, reported by AP or Reuters, between creation and July 31. The cycle continues.