It seems hard to get to <0% with China currently at 5+%. Even if it's a recession, it will still be around 2%.

@riverwalk3 Yea, this is really dependant on the CCP withdrawing support for the housing sector and allowing the losses to be reflected in the balance sheets of banks, housing developers and local governments, instead of increasing zombification by continued debt fueled papering over of the already induced damage.
I was considering it possible last year for the party to cut the losses and allow a repricing in the housing market, instead banks were directed to continue to extend loans to housing developers.

I guess the political consequences to the basis of legitimacy of the party leadership were considered to be too risky.

I think yes, the current state of China's domestic economy is really worrisome, although the government always hides some real data from the public, but the market will tell the truth, the biggest impact comes from the real estate market, in the first 7 months of 2023, the total home sales were 580 million square meters, compared to the year of 2022, a decline of 13%. But in July and August, home sales were just about 70% of the same period in 2022. Our rough estimate of core demand from household formation and urbanization (excluding the more speculative homebuyers) is around 800 million to 1 billion square meters per year. This suggests that investment demand has almost completely disappeared and that, on current trends, housing sales will most likely fall short of core demand this year. There is still a general surplus of housing stock. Of the 56 billion square meters of housing currently under construction, perhaps half is still for sale. At the current rate of demand, it may take three to four years to absorb the stock. This, coupled with the Chinese government's poor epidemic policy that saw many businesses close down at the time, has led to a loss of market dynamism that has undermined some of the country's most successful companies. Current Beijing policies have alienated some of China's biggest trading partners and brought it closer to countries like Russia, with Xi shifting the government's focus more toward ideology than economics.

Source: jpmorgan.privatebank. data as of september 2023

Thing is, you will never able to confirm it with Chinese data even if it's the case. Eg youth unemployment numbers...

Relevant related market: https://manifold.markets/RobertGledhill/will-chinese-dollar-denominated-exp

Will Chinese dollar denominated exports grow y-o-y in 2023

50% chance. In Q2 of 2023, Chinese exports dropped 14.5% Exports were 21% of GDP in 2022: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/china/exports/#:~:text=Exports%20of%20goods%20and%20services%20as%20percent%20of%20GDP&text=The%20latest%20value%20from%202022%20is%2020.68%20percent. China has a growth target of 5%. Reuters reporting will be used to determine the outcome [image][link preview]

Probably going to see a government debt driven rebound in the next quarters, but how not sustainable in the long run. More spending and deregulation of the housing market is just kicking the can down the road.

How would you know? The CCP has previously stopped reporting official economic numbers when the economy merely stopped growing as expected.

@brp Why not just resolve YES if the CCP stops reporting official economic numbers?

@bohaska Because the CCP likely would reach that point long before the Chinese economy was entering recession.

Better to use someone else's numbers.