If another statement on AI risk is released by May 31, 2023, who will be the Turing Award winner that signs it?
32
30k
resolved May 30
33%33%
Yoshua Bengio
33%33%
Geoffrey Hinton
33%33%
Martin Hellman
0.0%Other
0.2%
No such letter will be released.
0.0%
Yann Le Cun
0.2%
22b5bb65b14af58d9cfe2d1516e953e9
0.2%
Someone not listed here
0.0%
f548ad4b3f0d98d5368cac6ce9c4689c
0.0%
05113d921e762d91cc25303683273d8a
0.0%
0761270db61175e10d11012a16e8abdc
0.1%
794ba9712f15c8447f629e917fb6401f
0.0%
6f0deca5822080ec5eeb506a762086b7
0.0%
c95f2358a070d9b59a53004e468ac532

Derivative market of https://manifold.markets/quinesweeper/will-there-be-another-wellrecognize

That market requires a Turing Award winner to sign it to resolve YES. This market resolves to an equal split of every such person. Resolves "No such letter will be released" if it doesn't apply.

If a letter is published, any new entries added after publication are disregarded. The special entry "Someone not listed here." accumulates the weight due to any persons without an entry.

REGARDING HASHES: A hash of a Turing Award winner is acceptable if the name isn't already added as an entry. If somebody adds the plaintext name to the list, weight due to the person will be split across them by mana invested as of the publication time of the letter.

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Regarding the "Somebody not listed here." option that should've been picked over Martin Hellman.

I believe the pot had 4794 mana in it at the time of the Twitter announcement(2023-05-30 02:17 PST), 33% of it should be allocated to the "Someone not listed here" option, and that the table of share payouts was

| Username | Shares | Percentage of Pool | Mana owed
| KatjaGrace | 668 | 80% | 1279
| MayMeta | 109 | 13% | 209
| Mira | 47 | 5.6% | 90
| harfe | 10 | 1.2% | 19

So if @KatjaGrace , @MayMeta , @harfe would like like payouts of these amounts, contact ".mira.mira." on Discord and I'll send you a manalink.

My market description is not accurate: Martin Hellman should've been excluded unless he was one of the hashes, since people added the name after the statement was published. I see a Twitter announcement at 2:17 AM, and the entry added at 2:22 AM.

But people are trading based on the name being listed, and I have no way to resolve to a time in the past to exclude those trades. So I'm going to resolve including Martin, calculate the positions and size of the pot as of publication, and offer manalinks to anyone with a "Somebody not listed here." position which should've gotten the payout.

@firstuserhere my hash was 'ian goodfellow' - who did sign the letter but isnt a turing award winner i think, so, thats excluded

@firstuserhere echo 'ian goodfellow' | md5

22b5bb65b14af58d9cfe2d1516e953e9

@Mira I believe this should resolve to: Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio, and Martin Hellman.
Based on: https://www.safe.ai/statement-on-ai-risk#signatories

Posted a bunch of hashed Turing Award winners that were not yet listed but still might sign such a letter. If they will be publicly listed before this market closes, I'll sell my position in the hashed versions

I'll accept this hash if you later reveal the plaintext, but if somebody posts a plaintext answer that matches I'll split the share across them both.

So if there are 5 Turing Award winners, and your hash matches one, then I'll choose 6. 4 will get 20%, and 2 will get 10%.

@Mira that seems unfair to existing holder of plaintext responses - I could just make a hash of each and buy really cheap shares of them.

@RobertCousineau my hash isn't of an existing answer

@RobertCousineau It has to be a new answer to count. So if you add every Turing Award winner known to the list and have some minimum stake in each, it would prevent new hashes from being accepted.

@firstuserhere If it's MD5 (rather than something truncated) and salted I would vote for dismissing it preemptively - it's fairly easy to generate MD5 hash collisions for salted text strings.

@Imuli I've just finished reading the readme of the repo you've linked, and my conclusion is that this type of attack on an md5 hash is highly impractical: it requires the insertion of huge random-looking blocks of bytes. I say, that if the salt is reasonable, e.g. "John Smith, salt: 5af017d4", or even simpler "John Smith 5af0", then there's absolutely no reason to disqualify such a string.

If your understanding of those attacks is different - please do enlighten me.

I propose the following policy for hashes in the Free response markets:
If I think that Alice and Bob will be chosen, and Alice is already listed, I am allowed to list Hashed_Bob. When the market resolves, the creator is allowed to split the resolution equally between Alice and Revealed_Bob. But if Bob is listed by somebody else before the market resolution, I should transfer all of my shares from the Hashed_Bob to Bob, because his candidacy became public. In no case should the weight of the resolved market be equally split between the correct answer and the hashed duplicate of the same answer.

@MayMeta The main risk is if they announce a letter and I'm not the first person to hear about it, someone might add an entry and bid it up to it's natural percentage before I can close the market. I don't want to pay for people to rush to copy news into my market; I do want to pay for a prediction a week in advance like firstuserhere has done. And in your proposal, the predictors lose 100% of their investment if they're not the first ones to trade on news.

I think rejecting entries added after the letter is published, and otherwise splitting them by mana invested before publication is better.

@MayMeta I should have been more specific about the formats of salts that are easy to generate. Anything under 64 bytes long seems unlikely to be a generated collision (there are 64 byte collisions, and they can be generated shorter with the automatic padding, but I think that's not something you generally do on your own computer). My interest is more in building secure systems than breaking them, so I'm not terribly confident in that difficulty assessment.

That said, the most suspicious would be a name with a long salt after it, especially if the total comes to 128 bytes (or slightly less). The actual answer is to just use something other than SHA256 or Blake3 and truncate the hash if you want something shorter.

To confirm: if there isn't a letter released that fulfill the criteria to resolve yes in the parent market, you will not resolve this market N/A and will instead resolve it 100% to the option titled "No such letter will be released"?