The US has for decades operated under the understanding that neither it nor its adversaries would use ICBMs to deliver non-nuclear payloads because they would be indistinguishable from a first-use nuclear strike*, which would mean their use would risk a nuclear response even before they hit. However, there is a growing school of thought that China may disagree with this doctrinally, and may not bind itself by the same restriction.
*clearly this statement can be interrogated
Resolves NA if there is no war between China and the US before 2040.
Resolves YES if China uses Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles to strike the continental US or Hawaii (not US Territories), and those missiles deliver non-nuclear payloads.
(Note that 'non-nuclear' includes biological and chemical weapons, if such a question becomes relevant)
Resolves NO otherwise.
War= consensus understanding. If there is a disagreement over whether a war has taken place, I will make a decision and if I am unavailable then market participants can nominate a mutually agreeable adjudicator. The guiding principle should be that war involves a 'period' of military conflict rather than a single incident or even a brief spasm of violence. Brevity might be compensated for by the rapid accomplishment of strategic or even tactical goals.
ICBMs= missiles with a range greater than 5,500km (approx)
The distance between China and Hawaii is longer than what is usually considered the max range of IRBMs which do not have a 'taboo' on non-nuclear payloads. In that sense this question should not be complex or controversial
The introduction of hypersonic delivery systems may recomplicate this, but I will not rule on whether they would count until we have a clearer understanding of what they will look like and how they will be used.
For total clarity: missiles launched from outside of mainland China would not count, even if they are ballistic and long-range.
Update 2025-02-28 (PST) (AI summary of creator comment): Hypersonic Weapon Clarification
Hypersonic systems will only be considered equivalent to ICBMs if they resemble an ICBM when launched from China toward the US.
The assessment of whether a hypersonic weapon looks like an ICBM will include its flight trajectory, behavior, and any visual or operational characteristics that align with those of an ICBM.
All other resolution criteria (such as launch origin from mainland China and delivery of non-nuclear payloads) remain unchanged.
1,000@MalachiteEagle "The introduction of hypersonic delivery systems may recomplicate this, but I will not rule on whether they would count until we have a clearer understanding of what they will look like and how they will be used."
@JoshuaWilkes in general the question I will be asking is will this new weapon that we are calling hypersonic look like an ICBM if it is launched towards the US from China
@JoshuaWilkes that's quite nebulous. I think the ICBM early warning systems look at rocket engine plumes from the launch silos (taken from satellite feeds). Land-launched hypersonics have first stages that may look very similar to ICBMs.
@MalachiteEagle it's deliberately nebulous because there is no point ruling something in or out until we know what it is.
@JoshuaWilkes an example: what if China starts using hypersonic glide vehicles on its nuclear armed ICBMs? It would force this question to be NAed if I had ruled them out be specifying too early.
"I think the ICBM early warning systems look at rocket engine plumes from the launch silos " - they do, but they(/the system) are obviously capable of distinguishing between ICBMs and other rockets. I don't anticipate this is going to be the issue around hypersonics for the US. It will be whether they are nuclear-capable and have the range.
@ArmandodiMatteo Hainan and other offshore islands count but islands in South China Sea (administratively within Hainan province) do not.