Resolves as YES if there is strong evidence that the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has effectively become “AGI‑pilled” before January 1st 2027, as indicated by at least 3 of the following 5 criteria being clearly satisfied:

1. Explicit national AGI goal
   A public, centrally issued Party or state document (for example, a new AI development plan, a major “Opinions” document, a chapter of the 15th Five‑Year Plan, or a State Council notice) explicitly sets a general artificial intelligence / AGI / 通用人工智能 goal that is:

   • Distinct from generic “AI” development, and

   • Tied to a rough timeline (e.g. “by 2030/2035 we will achieve world‑leading general artificial intelligence capabilities”).

2. AGI‑centric leadership rhetoric
   There are at least three separate public speeches, signed articles, or interviews by members of the Politburo Standing Committee (including Xi Jinping or his successor) which, when taken at face value, do all of the following:

   • Explicitly mention AGI, “general artificial intelligence,” human‑level/general‑purpose AI, or an obviously equivalent term;

   • Treat such systems as likely or expected to be achieved (not just as a distant hypothetical); and

   • Describe them as strategically transformative for China’s comprehensive national power, security, or social order (for example, framing them as decisive for future great‑power competition or as a core engine of long‑term modernization).

   Each of the three instances must be on different dates and must be available in official or authoritative transcripts (e.g. Xinhua, People’s Daily, gov.cn).

3. Dedicated national AGI program or body
   The CCP or central government creates a clearly AGI‑focused national initiative, such as (examples only):

   • A named “National AGI Science and Technology Project,” “General Artificial Intelligence Major Special Project,” or similar, or

   • A central “leading small group” / commission / coordination mechanism whose publicly stated mission specifically includes the development or control of AGI / general artificial intelligence.

   To count, this body or program must:

   • Be announced at the national level (CCP Central Committee, State Council, or above); and

   • Either have a clearly indicated central funding scale of at least 10 billion RMB or be explicitly described as a “major national science and technology project,” “national strategic project,” or equivalent in status.

4. AGI‑specific safety or governance doctrine
   An official CCP or PRC government document (for example, a position paper, law, regulation, or central “Opinions”/“Guidelines”) explicitly discusses systemic or existential‑scale risks from AGI / general artificial intelligence / clearly defined frontier general‑purpose AI systems, and proposes governance tools tailored specifically to these systems (not just generic concerns like deepfakes, algorithmic bias, or online content moderation).

   To satisfy this criterion, the document must:

   • Clearly identify AGI‑level or general‑purpose advanced AI as a distinct risk category; and

   • Propose concrete measures (e.g., licenses, compute thresholds, red‑lines, emergency powers, international verification regimes) that are explicitly tied to those AGI‑level risks.

5. AGI‑oriented resource mobilization
   There is a major mobilization of state resources that is explicitly justified in terms of AGI / general artificial intelligence, such as any one of the following:

   • A large national investment or guidance fund (nominally ≥ 100 billion RMB total mobilized capital) whose stated purpose prominently includes “seizing the commanding heights of general artificial intelligence,” “winning the AGI race,” or equivalent;

   • A major reorganization, merger, or de‑facto nationalization of one or more leading frontier‑model labs or AI companies, where official messaging frames the move as necessary to secure or control AGI‑level capabilities for the Party‑state;

   • A significant national compute, data, or chip‑infrastructure program whose central, public justification explicitly centers on preparing for or enabling AGI / general artificial intelligence (not just “AI” or “digital economy” in general).

   Generic AI‑oriented funds, chip subsidies, or industrial parks do not count unless AGI / 通用人工智能 is called out as a core rationale in the official description.

Resolution details

• Who counts as “top leadership”?
  For the purposes of this market, “top leadership of the CCP” means the Politburo Standing Committee and the General Secretary (Xi Jinping). Evidence can also come from documents clearly issued in their name or under their direct authority (e.g., a Central Committee “Decision” or State Council document that is widely described in official media as reflecting the leadership’s will).

• What counts as “strong evidence”?
  Strong evidence means that a reasonable outside observer, relying on open‑source information, would conclude that the criterion is met. In practice this means:

  • Official Chinese publications (laws, plans, white papers, authoritative communiqués);

  • Transcripts or summaries from Party‑state media (Xinhua, People’s Daily, CCTV, gov.cn, etc.);

  • High‑quality secondary analyses (think tanks, academic papers, well‑established international media) that clearly report and contextualize those primary sources.

  Private rumors, anonymous leaks, or purely corporate marketing claims do not count.

• Non‑examples / things that don’t count

  • City‑level or provincial AGI branding without a clear link to national‑level strategy;

  • One‑off mentions of “general intelligence” that don’t commit to feasibility or strategic salience;

  • Generic “AI,” “intelligentization,” or “new quality productivity” language that doesn’t clearly distinguish AGI from ordinary AI;

  • Corporate AGI talk (e.g., from a tech CEO) that is not echoed or endorsed by Party‑state documents or senior leadership.

• YES vs NO

  • Resolve YES if, by 23:59 on December 31, 2026 Beijing time, three or more of the five criteria above are clearly satisfied.

  • Resolve NO if two or fewer criteria are satisfied by that time.
    
    

Borderline cases should be judged by looking at the plain meaning of the Chinese‑language sources and how they’re interpreted by multiple independent, reputable analysts. If there is serious, sustained ambiguity about whether the threshold is met, the market should lean toward NO, unless there are clearly ≥3 criteria with strong, uncontroversial evidence.