Resolves YES if all of the below happens in 2023:

• recapture of Crimea remains one of Ukraine’s government’s official goals, and

• Ukraine’s military regains more than half of the Kherson oblast land south of the Dnipro river, in an advance toward Crimea, and/or regains any settlement in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and holds either for more than a month, and

• Russia uses nuclear weapons in 2023 in combat (including dirty bombs, but not including the purposeful destruction of nuclear power plants and the like).

If there’s a dispute about what gains and advances happened, and/or what constitutes combat use, and/or if Kremlin denies responsibility for a nuclear weapons attack, I’ll defer to the Western mainstream expert and political consensus using my best judgment.

Resolves N/A if Ukraine does not make a successful push in this region, or if I consider the Russian responsibility for a nuclear weapons attack to be very seriously disputed.

Resolves NO otherwise – if Ukraine regains majority of the Kherson oblast lands south of Dnipro, or recaptures any settlements on the Crimean Peninsula, but Russia isn’t suspected of using nuclear weapons in combat by the year’s end.

Context: All-in podcast, E110, “2023 Bestie Predictions!”

David Sacks: “[Most contrarian belief for 2023.] Like I said, this is leading up to a huge Ukrainian counteroffensive in the spring and I really don't know what's gonna happen at that point. I do think that the Russians will escalate, I don't think they can afford to lose this war. They view it as existential. (…) I think the Russians confronted with a choice between a total defeat that includes losing Crimea and their naval base at Sevastopol, and seeing the Ukrainian flag flying over their base at Sevastopol, if that's a choice between, that or potentially using a tactical nuke, maybe at the mouth of the Crimean Peninsula as a firewall, I think they could choose the nuke option (…).”