This market resolves to the number of NATO member countries that officially report major Russian disinformation campaigns targeting their national or EU parliamentary elections between now and April 30, 2025.

A "major disinformation campaign" must be:

1. Officially attributed to Russia or Russian-linked actors by the country's government, intelligence agencies, or electoral authorities

2. Described as significant or substantial in its potential impact on the electoral process

Sources for monitoring:

• EUvsDisinfo

• NATO StratCom COE

• Atlantic Council's DFRLab

• Official statements from NATO member governments

  Background

  Russian disinformation campaigns targeting elections in NATO countries have become increasingly sophisticated and prevalent in recent years. These operations typically involve coordinated efforts to spread false information, amplify divisive content, and undermine public trust in democratic institutions.

  Several NATO countries have already identified Russian disinformation efforts in previous elections:

  • Germany has warned about the "Doppelgänger" campaign targeting their political landscape

  • Croatia has experienced Russian bot activity supporting anti-NATO candidates

  • Poland has expressed concerns about potential Russian interference

  • The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) have historically been frequent targets

  During 2024-2025, several NATO members have scheduled elections, including the United States, United Kingdom, Portugal, Finland, and others, providing potential targets for Russian influence operations.

  Resolution Criteria

  This market resolves to the number of NATO member countries that officially report major Russian disinformation campaigns targeting their national or EU parliamentary elections between now and April 30, 2025.

  For a report to qualify:

  1. It must be officially attributed to Russia or Russian-linked actors by the country's government, intelligence agencies, or electoral authorities

  2. The campaign must be described as significant or substantial in its potential impact on the electoral process

  The market will resolve based on the total count of NATO countries meeting these criteria by the resolution date. Each country will only be counted once, regardless of how many elections or disinformation campaigns they report during the period.

  Sources for verification will include:

  • EUvsDisinfo

  • NATO StratCom COE

  • Atlantic Council's DFRLab

  • Official statements from NATO member governments

  Considerations

  • Attribution of disinformation campaigns can be complex and sometimes delayed, as intelligence agencies may require time to gather and analyze evidence before making public statements

  • Some countries may experience Russian disinformation but choose not to publicly attribute it for diplomatic or strategic reasons

  • The threshold for what constitutes a "major" campaign may vary between countries based on their size, geopolitical significance, and historical experience with Russian interference