The question isn’t well-posed. A perfectly posed version may not exist. But I think we can do better.

Taken in its current form does this mean it’s always ethically wrong to eat meat for any sentient creature or just for humans?

Take for example the Jataka Tale of the Bodhisattva aka Starving Tigress. There a monk offers his body as food to a starving Tigress with cubs, which then also allows her to produce milk for her cubs as well to survive to parent then. If eating meat is always wrong, then this is not an ethical story. It’s a story of a monk engaging in unwholesome behavior and somewhat anthropomorphized tiger and her cubs also engaging in unethical behavior.

Clearly, a virtue ethics approach has to consider specific circumstances.

To iterate on your question it would be better posed talking in to consideration multiple factors that could impact the outcome. For humans who have no dietary restrictions preventing them from getting nutrition from non-animal sources and have resources and means to procure those sources of nutrition, is it ethical for them to continue to eat meat or otherwise consume animal products?

Name the Trait

Often, it is claimed that consumption of animal products is ethical based on their lower intelligence.

This spurs the rebuttal of “what about babies, people with disabilities, and comatose people?”

Which further asks “Given that Von Neumann is more intelligent than you (the individual positing that animal product consumption is ethical) does that mean he has a right to cannibalism?”

Thus begins the game of “Name the Trait” in which Bob names a trait he claims animals do not have, and thus claims that given this, it is morally permissible to kill them.

To which Alice will either 1) Name an animal with that trait, 2) A human with less of that trait than a/a group of animal/s, 3) Make an argument as to why the line being drawn is as arbitrary as those drawn by a racist or sexist.

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Another Fundamental argument is simple “Suffering is bad”. If this premise is accepted as true, then ways of consuming products that don’t require suffering present themselves. For example, Genetically modified Animals that feel only pleasure. Or that desire to be eaten, Such as in The Restaurant at the end of the Universe. Unfortunately, as the mentioned book examines, most people find the idea of creating a cow which longs to be eaten to be ‘gross’ or, wrong for the sake of being wrong.

And in any case, there are no ways of achieving animals such of those described with current understanding.

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Beastiality Is commonly regarded as wrong. The argument as to why is often “Because it harms the animal”.

However, forced impregnation with larger syringes is a common practice on Dairy Farms and at Piggeries. Why this is not wrong, yet beastiality is, is an uncomfortable unresolved issue.

Some philosophers argue that sex with an animal is inherently ‘gross’ and this makes it wrong. Though many things are ‘gross’ and not morally wrong: Picking your nose then washing your hands to avoid germ spread, Babies vomiting, Accidentally eating your hair, Slugs, Flies eating your sweat.

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## o3-Mini’s take:

Below is one way to reconstruct Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument for why veganism is the morally correct lifestyle. This argument unfolds step by step, starting with the basic utilitarian premises about suffering and happiness, applying them to nonhuman animals, and then concluding that—given our modern alternatives—there is no morally justifiable reason to support a system that inflicts enormous, unnecessary suffering on sentient beings.

1. The Fundamental Principle: Equal Consideration of Interests

At the heart of Singer’s ethical thought is a utilitarian principle: an action is right if it maximizes overall well‐being (or minimizes suffering) and wrong if it does not. In Practical Ethics and Animal Liberation, Singer argues that the only morally relevant property a being may have is its capacity to experience suffering or enjoyment. In other words, if a being can suffer, then its interests (in not suffering) must be given equal consideration with the interests of any other being—human or nonhuman. This is sometimes summed up by saying that species membership (i.e. being “human”) is not a morally relevant criterion (a view Singer terms “speciesism”)  .

2. Sentience and the Capacity to Suffer

Singer notes that many nonhuman animals are sentient—that is, they have the capacity to experience pain and pleasure. Because their ability to suffer is similar in kind to our own, the suffering of animals must be taken into account in our ethical calculations. No matter how different an animal’s cognitive abilities might be from a human’s, the capacity for suffering is the crucial aspect that matters morally. Thus, when we ask whether it is acceptable to inflict pain, we must ask whether we have a justified reason to impose such suffering on any sentient being  .

3. The Nature of Modern Animal Agriculture

In Singer’s view, industrial animal agriculture is an institution that causes vast amounts of suffering to animals. Factory farming is characterized by conditions in which animals—confined, bred solely for rapid growth, and subjected to inhumane procedures—experience extreme stress, pain, and premature death. Importantly, these animals are used for reasons of convenience, pleasure, and profit rather than necessity. Since there is an abundance of nutritionally adequate, plant-based alternatives available today, there is no compelling reason to inflict such suffering on sentient beings.

4. Unnecessary Suffering and the Moral Imperative

Given that:

• (a)Suffering is inherently bad, and reducing suffering is a moral good;

• (b)Animals are capable of suffering and have interests that count equally to those of humans;

• (c)Modern farming practices inflict enormous, unnecessary suffering on billions of animals for non-essential purposes;

Singer concludes that it is morally wrong to support or participate in a system that relies on animal exploitation. In other words, if we have a choice between continuing to support an industry that inflicts immense suffering and adopting a lifestyle that avoids such exploitation, utilitarian reasoning tells us that the latter (veganism) is morally required. As Singer famously illustrates with his “drowning child” analogy—if you see a child drowning in a shallow pond and you can save the child at little cost to yourself, you are morally obligated to do so—so too, if you can reduce animal suffering by choosing a plant-based diet at little personal cost, you ought to do it.

5. Addressing Common Objections

Some might object that an individual’s choice to eat vegan won’t change the overall scale of animal suffering. However, Singer argues that our individual actions contribute to the overall demand for animal products. If many people choose veganism, the aggregate effect is to reduce the profitability and scale of factory farming. Even if an individual’s “vote with their dollar” seems small, utilitarian ethics cares about the sum total of all such choices. Moreover, if we had to compare saving one human life with preventing a small amount of animal suffering, Singer’s argument is that—when the cost is low—moral duty requires action regardless of the seemingly negligible individual impact.

6. Conclusion: The Moral Consistency of Veganism

In summary, from a Singerian utilitarian perspective:

• Because the capacity to suffer is the sole morally relevant property,

• And because modern animal agriculture inflicts enormous, unnecessary suffering on sentient beings for reasons of convenience,

• And because we have available alternatives that can meet our nutritional needs without supporting such cruelty,

it follows that we have a moral imperative to adopt veganism. By doing so, we minimize suffering and act in a manner that is consistent with giving equal consideration to all sentient interests. For Singer, this is not merely a lifestyle choice—it is a moral duty that follows from a consistent application of utilitarian principles.

This logical argument encapsulates Singer’s reasoning: if one accepts that reducing suffering is paramount and that animals’ capacity for suffering matters morally, then supporting practices that cause such suffering is unjustifiable. Veganism, as a lifestyle that avoids supporting those practices, is therefore the morally correct choice.