Resolution criteria

This market resolves YES if any individual, organization, or state successfully demonstrates the creation of infectious smallpox (variola virus) through synthesis or engineering before January 1, 2028, and publicly discloses or is discovered to have done so. This includes de novo synthesis from genetic sequences, modification of related orthopoxviruses, or any other method of creation outside of the two authorized WHO repositories (CDC Atlanta and VECTOR Institute Russia).

Resolution requires credible public evidence such as: peer-reviewed publication, official government/health authority confirmation, credible news reporting from established outlets, or documented discovery by biosecurity authorities. The market resolves NO if no such successful creation is publicly documented by the deadline.

Background

In March 2017, a Canadian scientist synthesized horsepox virus as part of a project to develop a safer vaccine against smallpox, marking the first de novo synthesis of an orthopoxvirus. Re-creating the horsepox virus did not require extensive resources—the researchers ordered DNA fragments from a company that makes DNA pieces for researchers, and the project cost $100,000 and took six months.

Emerging technologies including gene editing, genome synthesis, and other techniques advanced by artificial intelligence contribute to future risks. Artificial intelligence and large language models might pose potential risks to biosecurity and could increase the likelihood of unsanctioned research to re-create smallpox or a virus resembling smallpox.

Considerations

Although the WHO bans individual laboratories from synthesizing more than 20% of the genome at a time, and purchases of smallpox genome fragments are monitored and regulated, a group with malicious intentions could compile, from multiple sources, the full synthetic genome necessary to produce viable virus. A study in the journal Science has demonstrated how AI could be used to easily circumvent biosafety screening processes. The definition of "successful redteaming" may be subject to interpretation—whether it requires functional infectious virus, proof-of-concept demonstration, or merely documented capability.