Will the territory controlled by Ukraine/Russia change significantly at any time before January 1, 2025? This would include major territorial gains or capture of important cities/objects.
Possible examples: Russian capture of Zaporizhzhia/Kherson, Ukrainian Capture of Melitopol. Not sufficient: capture of cities like Bakhmut (little strategic importance or territorial gains).
The resolution will be subjective to a degree, feel free to ask about any particular cases. There are quite a few discussions on individual cases in the comments of previous markets.
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It's a good question as well, and one that's hard to answer. The tactical importance will be not relevant; strategic importance would be, but is hard to define precisely - that's why I named Kramatorsk as an example. It's smaller that Zaporizhzhia or Kherson I mentioned in the description, but I'd say its size and strategic importance make it significant enough.
As for the territory - I looked up my comments on last year's market:
I'm not sure I can give exact numbers. A dozen kilometers on a wide front would presumably be sufficient.
Thanks. That's interesting, but raises the question of what would constitute a wide front. For example, from the south-eastern tip of Avdeevka to the current tip of the Russian salient that has been growing since its capture, there's about 29 km. But this salient is not terribly wide.
In the north, over something like 90 km, the Russians are more or less on the banks of the Zherebets river, trying to push west to the Oskol, which is from 15 to 30 km away (roughly speaking, and depending on where you measure the distance between the rivers). If they reached the Oskol from Kupiansk to the Donets river, would this resolve to yes? From Kupiansk to the point where the Oskol flows into the Donets, you have about 69 (nice) km as the crow flies, and obviously a bit more than that if you count the river's meanders. This would be an advance of more than a dozen km, but would it be a wide front?
Thanks for the detailed and thoughtful comment. I have to admit I haven't been following the movements on the front over the last couple of months, and have to look up pretty much all of this.
Let me try to approach it this way. To me (and most others, I think), the 2022 Ukraine counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region was clearly significant, even disregarding individual towns such as Kupyansk; and it captured about 12.000 square kilometers. So I'd say anything over, say, 10.000 square kilometers definitely counts. 1.000 kilometers would be not enough, I think. But I'm not sure right now where exactly to draw the line in between - you're welcome to make suggestions if you have good ideas about it.
Thank you for trying to come up with objective criteria, it's helpful for those of us betting on this (and also just kind of interesting for its own sake, in my opinion).
That being said, I'd be really hard-pressed to come up with a number, because I just don't think territory matters very much, or at least not in terms of square kilometers, not at this stage of the war. Ukraine is fighting for independence from Russia and the right to join NATO; Russia is fighting for primarily political objectives: Ukrainian neutrality, no NATO in Ukraine, no foreign troops, limited military, some more or less symbolic measures about far-right movements in Ukraine and rights for Russian speakers, etc. Territory is part of it now, but I think mostly because the Russian population will demand something more tangible than political concessions given the very heavy price paid in blood, and because most Russians think of Donbass as Russia now—not only for these reasons, but I think mostly.
Since I perceive their respective objectives as such, I'd regard gains as significant if they significantly help one side achieve said strategic objectives, almost entirely regardless of the size of the territory captured. So, if Ukraine managed to get a thin little salient reaching and capturing Tokmak, I'd regard it as significant, not because it would win them the war or anything close to that, but because they'd wedge themselves in the relatively narrow land bridge between de jure Russia and Crimea, forcing the Russians to fight back and focus on this area to reduce the risks for Crimea, which would divert resources away from other areas and hinder their ability to pursue their main objectives. That alone would be a big win for Ukraine, I think.
Likewise, I tend to see what's developing out of the Avdeevka/Ocheretino salient as significant because it threatens the major supply line that runs from Pokrovsk to Toretsk, while we're seeing the early but clear beginnings of an envelopment movement on Toretsk, from New York in the south, and its suburbs in the east. Toretsk is not a big place at all, but it's been fortified for 10 years, so if it falls to these maneuvers, the big line of fortified towns/cities that runs from Slaviansk to Kramatorsk to Konstantinovka and Toretsk will effectively be bypassed on its southern flank, forcing Ukraine to commit massive resources to this area, or risk losing this whole line, and thus all of Donbass.
More generally, when a heavily fortified place falls, even if it's relatively small, I think it's usually significant because it often means the defending side now has to fight from a less favorable position, often diminishing their casualties_inflicted/casualties_suffered ratio, which is absolutely critical in a war of attrition, which this currently is. Toretsk also matters for this.
For this reason, the Russian push west toward the O0532 road is something I'm keeping an eye on, because that's the only significant supply line for Ugledar (a.k.a. Vuhledar) still useable for Ukraine. And while this town isn't big either, it's also very heavily fortified, full of very defensible high rises, and built on top of a hill that overlooks mostly flat plains full of anti-tank mines. If the road is cut, I'd expect the town to inevitably fall within some weeks or months (depending on how stubborn its defense proves), ultimately opening the way for the Russians to push west along the T0509 road, attacking a number of Ukrainian positions from the east, while they were fortified to defend from assaults coming from the south. This would also widen the land bridge to Crimea, making the Russians more secure in what is likely their key vulnerability at the moment.
Ultimately, this could pave the way for the capture of most of Zap' oblast, possibly even including Zap city too, but in my opinion it doesn't need to go anywhere near that far to be significant.
So, I'm really not sure this answers your question at all, but that's how I look at it.
Seems like Russia lost their best window to attack, and I wouldn't say the front lines have changed significantly yet.
@JimAusman I strongly suspect they eventually will, but if and when they do, it would make sense to try to make the most of it, which will require time, likely a somewhat focused and sustained bombing campaign beforehand, perhaps diversions of various kinds, etc. Throwing insufficient forces at well prepared defenses might be counterproductive, or at least suboptimal.
@JimAusman Just because they have more manpower than Ukraine, doesn't mean they have enough to win a new offensive. The Russians don't have big blocks of soldiers doing nothing, if they increase the tempo on one part of the front that means decreasing it in another. They're also limited on equipment and training which scale slower than manpower and aren't as visible.
And if they don't have an overwhelming advantage in manpower it also makes sense to consider war goals - are they going for Kyiv again? If not then an offensive in the North would ultimately be only a negotiating or tactical tool rather than conquest to take and hold land (which is at least the stated aim of the current offensives in the east/south and the war as a whole).
@JimAusman Good call, seems like Russia agreed with you. I'm not sure why they hadn't tried sooner.
Created a market specifically for Kharkiv in response to news about russia preparing to take over the city: https://manifold.markets/SlipperySloe/what-will-happen-to-kharkiv-in-2024?r=U2xpcHBlcnlTbG9l
@cowgoesmoo If the war ends without any major changes in territory, this resolves no. If there are major developments, this is resolves yes immediately (well, as soon as the changes and their scale are confirmed beyond doubt).
@PS What if the order goes:
1. There is no major change in territory due to military operations
2. The war ends with a treaty
3. The treaty involves major changes in territory compared to the current front lines, e.g. Russia gives up some of Kherson oblast to get more of Donetsk oblast.
In that case, would this resolve yes?
@PS Would you mind making a market just for Q1 of 2024? Since this is trading so high, near 70%, it might be worth it to have ones with shorter time frames. I’m happy to make one if you don’t want to.
@TimDuffy I just bet Yes, 45% (M20, that's all I had...), I think Russia will gain more territory before -24 ends. Maybe I believe too much in the guys at Judging Freedom though.