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The walls of this petri dish being more sophisitcated than any current observation system made by man, including the ability the ability to create gravity waves. π½π΅οΈββοΈπ€
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The solution to Fermi Paradox is the lack of detection capability. SETI is a joke and would likely not pick another Earth around one of the nearest stars and definitely not one located further away unless it was constantly beaming strong signals directly at Earth. Probes? We were unable to investigate Oumuamua. Anything smaller? Forget it. I thereby close this topic.
@MikkoKiiskila You mean, like, The Truman Show? That has nothing to do with Bostrom's simulation argument.
@singer well I guess it depends on how a "computer" can be defined with more advanced capabilities no? π€·ββοΈπ
@MikkoKiiskila Here you can read Bostrom's argument: https://simulation-argument.com/simulation/. One of the premises is that generating realistic individual phenomenologies is computationally cheap, compared to the resource cost of having an entire physical solar system with only 10 or so billion anthropic observers in it. The argument doesn't work if the aliens need to make physical zoos for every "simulation". As an analogy, imagine if people renting servers on AWS had to physically construct a new building every time they wanted to rent a server. The economics of it would fall apart.
@singer there was another simulation concept, more widely spread:
The whole visible universe is simulated, every single bozon.
The argument that it is computationally expensive does not apply, because 1) there is no reason to believe the Universe where the computer is situated has the same limitations as ours. It might be very cheap out there.
2) It might be expensive, but the computer is accordingly slow. No matter how slow he becomes, we would never know. Internal parameters of the simulation do not depend on the flow of real time. Just like in numerical integration program I can add sleep(100) anywhere, and no event inside the integration results would be changed.
1) there is no reason to believe the Universe where the computer is situated has the same limitations as ours
It's simpler to assume there isn't any extra Universe. What does adding another Universe contribute to the argument?
but the computer is accordingly slow. No matter how slow he becomes, we would never know. Internal parameters of the simulation do not depend on the flow of real time
While it won't matter inside the simulation, it will matter outside of it. If the simulation is too costly to run or requires too much time, it's less likely that its creators will go through with it.
@singer the "universe above" might not have time at all. If we allow simulation discussions at all, the more general "universe above" does not truncate possibilities, does not narrow down to "their laws of physics and logic and resource are the same". That is extremely strict assumption that has no evidence to be so specific.
General universe, having other laws of physics, COULD have a very cheap setting, making the whole simulation more probable IF the real universe is the general.
And, just like a kid programs small simulations to see what happens when gravity depends on r^3 instead of r^2, our "simulation" could be just an experiment to see some kind of emergent behaviours. Like when sb creates a virtual garden to see how pixel trees evolve to survive in a setting.
I do not believe any simulation concept is true. I think that making so narrow concepts, as the one you refer to, is unreasonable. The "real universe" might not have ANY concept that we are familiar with: no "resource", no "time", no "speed limit", etc. All those could be emergent phenomena of the setting the simulation started with.
@KongoLandwalker Bostrom's argument goes like this:
Consider the following propositions:
(1) Our world is about to end, preventing civilization from spreading into space.
(2) If we survive and colonize space, our descendents won't create large numbers of simulations of the past.
(3) We are probably in a simulation.
Bostrom argues that at least one of these propositions must be true. The "simulation argument" isn't arguing that we necessarily live in a simulation, just that you ought to accept at least one of the above propositions. So, you might argue that (2) is true. In that case, there must be some reason preventing our post-human descendents from making simulations of our era, since it would be very cheap for them to do this (you can read Bostrom's original paper to see his math). Running billions of perceptually indistinguishable simulations of our history would be simple for them. So, if you believe in (2), there must be some special reason why they don't do this. What would that reason be?
Maybe (1) is true instead, in which case it's a moot point whether our post-human descendents would do something because they won't ever exist if we die first.
But if (2) is false and (1) is false, then the most obvious conclusion is that we live in a simulation, like the vast majority of observers do. It would be a strange coincidence if our world was the original simulator, when so many billions of simulations are going on.
None of this invokes other Universes with other laws of physics, or needs there to be a "real universe". In the simulation argument, both the entities in the simulation and the machine running the simulation are equally real, part of the same reality. Just like how software on your computer is real. Whether or not there are other Universes with other laws of physics is irrelevant to the argument.
@singer i don't know the name of this mistake, but he clearly messes up facts about observable universe and about "universe above" (about simulation and the computer). Starts talking about space era, but spreads local consequences onto the "universe above", WHICH MIGHT NOT EVEN HAVE THE SAME LAWS OF PHYSICS. Spaces of possibilities are truncated.
In what you have written almost everything is not logical, even if we take as axiom that physics are the same.
So, if you believe in (2), there must be some special reason why they don't do this.
Don't you see? "If X is in A, then Y is not in B", but A and B are completely different entities. You cannot justify whatever happenED in "the real universe"(where the simulation started) by any facts that will happen to our descendants. It messes with the flow of time, by assuming our future events dictate our current state.
Also, simulation might not be run by humans at all. It could be run by dinosaurs, who wanted to see, how the earth would evolve if they did not survive (humans were never a real thing in this scenario. Even with unnecessary limitation "simulation has the same physics as the universe" i have already found a counterexample to implications you mentioned. Our simulation could end tomorrow, so talking about descendants and how THEY are building simulations is breaking the direction of time (which is the same, because it is part of "same physics"). Their actions do not matter for our state. ).
If (we are in a simulation) and (physics are the same) then (simulation started IN THE PAST of the universe, not in the future of simulation).
The whole Bolstrom argument creates insane limitations/assumptions, like that simulations simulate the universe itself at different time of history.
That is like starting with "if aliens exist, then they are definitely unicorns", and then making a whole theory about unicorns.
It is not necessary that "at least 1 of statements is true".
Next to EVERY word "then" in your comment i wanted to write "false", because logical implication is used incorrectly every time. But explaining mistakes always takes >10x time than making them. What you have written used so many logical mistakes and jumps that it would take like 20 A4 pages already to write down. So i should better not continue.
Anyway, thanks for your time and the introduction. It gave me valuable info not to read his work. I have only seen such dense nonsense in a perpetuum-mobile publication. I do not support any of simulation theories, but what you described is the worst of all I met.
You cannot justify whatever happenED in "the real universe"(where the simulation started) by any facts that will happen to our descendants. It messes with the flow of time, by assuming our future events dictate our current state.
If you reason this way, you're going to be losing around $1 million in Newcomb's paradox. Causal decision theory might be what feels most intuitive to you, but it has competition:
https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/evidential-decision-theory
If you are willing to, I'd love to hear your criticisms of EDT. It's very much a live question right now in philosophy.
Also, simulation might not be run by humans at all. It could be run by dinosaurs, who wanted to see, how the earth would evolve if they did not survive (humans were never a real thing in this scenario.
Bostrom isn't claiming the simulation runners are humans like us, just that in their history they're descended from the world that our simulation is modelled after. But it doesn't seem like the argument even depends on that fact being true. They could be aliens who are just interested in simulating a wide variety of worlds, and the same three propositions would be the same, except without the restriction that they're "post-human".