Resolves to
No if costs and payouts for making markets stays the same until close
Yes if costs or payouts for making markets change substantially
Resolves for changes after open only.
The spirit of this question is about whether the currently availble exploit of making lots of profitable markets stating "this market will resolve to yes tomorrow" will still be possible at close. I will resolve accordingly.
I will not bet on this market.
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@IsaacKing By "exploit" I did not mean an IT-Security exploit, but a broken trading strategy. E.g., I think you can create a bot that does nothing but opening markets resolving to YES the next day, and this bot should be profitable.
I think prediction markets should reward traders who correct bad predictions (and maybe market makers who create interesting markets) with more power to be better able to correct bad predictions. I think the reward structures should not incentivize spamming boring markets.
Thus I think the incentives for making markets are not sufficiently aligned with my goals, which I think many people in here share (alignment failure).
If you have a strong argument for keeping the current incentive structure exactly as is, I'd be interested in hearing it!