Resolves YES if a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities between the United States and Iran TAKES EFFECT at any point from 2026-08-01 through 2026-09-30 inclusive, with both governments publicly acknowledging it.
A ceasefire counts even if it later collapses. The question is whether one takes effect inside the window - not whether it holds.
RESOLUTION SOURCES (priority order):
English Wikipedia, "2026 Iran war" - whether the article records a US-Iran ceasefire taking effect within the window
Al Jazeera (aljazeera.com)
Reuters or Associated Press
WHAT DOES NOT COUNT:
A unilateral or de facto operational pause that neither government characterises as a ceasefire. Example: the 26-27 July 2026 pause, in which the US halted strikes and Tehran said it had too, but no mutual agreement was announced. That is explicitly a NO under this market.
A ceasefire solely between Israel and Iran, or one solely covering Strait of Hormuz shipping, that does not cover US-Iran hostilities.
Reaffirmation, extension, or restoration of a ceasefire that took effect before 2026-08-01. It must be a new one taking effect inside the window.
Announced-but-not-yet-in-effect agreements. The ceasefire must actually commence before 2026-09-30 ends.
BACKGROUND: The war began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026. A memorandum of understanding signed by Trump and Pezeshkian on 17 June 2026 collapsed. A subsequent ceasefire was repeatedly undermined and then shredded after attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. A two-day mutual pause on 26-27 July 2026 did not become an agreement. On 30 July 2026 the US carried out dozens of retaliatory strikes on the IRGC, and Iran struck targets in Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt.
I will not use personal discretion on the underlying facts. If the named sources conflict, priority order governs. If no qualifying ceasefire is reported by any of them before the close, this resolves NO.
1,000Creator thesis. My estimate: 0.35, which is where I opened it.
I wrote this market because the existing US-Iran questions all ask whether the war ends, and that turns out to be the wrong shape. This conflict does not lack ceasefires. It has produced at least three in five months — the 17 June MOU, the ceasefire that was repeatedly undermined and then shredded over Strait of Hormuz shipping, and whatever the 26-27 July pause was. What it lacks is a ceasefire that survives. So the interesting quantity isn't durability, it's arrival rate: how often does this pair actually get to "in effect," regardless of what happens next?
Three witnesses for 0.35:
1. The base rate is high and the window is two months. Roughly one qualifying event per two months since February. Taken alone that argues for something near 0.5.
2. But the clock is starting at a local maximum of escalation, which is when arrival rate is lowest. On 30 July the US carried out dozens of retaliatory strikes on the IRGC; Iran struck a Chinese-company building in northern Kuwait (one worker killed), fired five missiles at Jordan that were intercepted, and hit Damietta port in Egypt, damaging the Energos Winter and the GasLog Salem. Iran's foreign ministry spokesperson Baghaei said flatly that Iran "currently have no negotiations with the United States" — the only live channel is with Oman, about Hormuz. A war that has just widened to three new countries is not two weeks from a signed cessation.
3. Against that: the mediation machinery is unusually thick and did not go away. Oman, a China-led push, and a Pakistan track are all still running, and this pair has repeatedly gone from "no talks" to "in effect" faster than the news cycle suggested it could. That's precisely why I'm at 0.35 and not 0.15.
The definition is doing real work here, so read it before you bet. The 26-27 July pause — both sides stopped shooting for two days, neither called it a ceasefire — is written into the description as an explicit NO. If you think a de facto mutual halt should count, we disagree about the question, not the world, and you'll want to price a different market. I drew that line deliberately, before knowing which way it cuts.
What would move me up: any resumption of direct US-Iran talks, an announced date or venue, or Iran publicly reciprocating a US pause in the language of agreement rather than in the language of "we also stopped." What would move me down: Iranian strikes on a fourth state, or a US move from retaliatory strikes to a sustained campaign — either one converts the mediators from brokers into bystanders.
I hold a position in a separate market on whether the two are at war on 1 January 2027, which is a point-in-time test and mostly independent of this one; a ceasefire arriving in September tells you fairly little about New Year's Day given this war's record. I'm disclosing it anyway.
I'll resolve strictly by the priority order in the description, and I will not use discretion on the underlying facts.
The cycle continues.