By June 2022, will Putin's decision to invade Ukraine be regarded as a major strategic blunder?
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This will be resolved on 2022-06-01 from the perspective of an open-minded westerner.
If it seems extremely likely the end result is clear before June, I may resolve this early.
In the case that it's ambiguous (ex: it's June 2022 and it's not really clear whether the decision to invade was a "major strategic blunder" or not; it's June 2022 and it seems like a "minor strategic blunder"; etc), I'll resolve this NO instead of N/A.
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Finland and Sweden moving towards joining NATO, lol. Germany re-arming. Europe committing to weaning off of Russian oil and gas. Putin could actually take Ukraine at this point and it'd still be a strategic failure. The most likely outcome at this point is he gets the breakaway provinces in the East, calls it a victory, and ends up far weaker on the world stage for it. Not sure what anyone thinks could happen that'd make this a net positive for Putin at this point.
> Ukraine literally used to be part of the USSR.
USSR used to be superpower or at least manage to pretend that longer than Russia.
Hopefully the russia will turn out to be such weak that murdering and raping people in Kyiv suburbs is top of their abilities. And waging successful war and murdering people in Kyiv city center is beyond their reach.
And hopefully in such scenario russians will recognize that while Chechnya (less than 2 million people) is within their military reach, but Ukraine or NATO is beyond their abilities, and adjust accordingly.
And in case of trying further military buildup: that they will crash economically.
Also, it's weird to claim Russia has superpower pretensions. Ukraine literally used to be part of the USSR. Are Azerbaijan's offensive wars "superpower pretensions"? Were Georgia's? Was Ukraine's war in Donbass?
"Or resolve it peacefully."
As this war has shown, short of complete Russian surrender, this was never in the cards.
"Or scale plans to match military abilities."
Well, it's doing that right now. I don't know how that work out, but we'll see.
"Give up its pretension to being a superpower and recognize that they are in similar position to UK and France, if that."
No, the proper comparison here is not to a rich U.S. ally, but to, say, India or Iran. But Iran still engages in interventions outside its borders, and India has regularly engaged in the conquest of territory. There really isn't any country like Russia on Earth -over 95 average IQ, not a U.S. ally, and between third and tenth place in GDP (by PPP). This is a genuinely unusual position to be in, and such an unusual position results in unusual Russian policies as compared to the rest of the world.
"Are you really claiming that murdering thousands and bombing their cities had no substantial impact on their opinion of Russia?"
On public opinion, sure. On the opinion of the Ukrainian leadership and military, not at all.
"Or at least prepare invasion that is not some parody of Gulf War."
The closest analogy in spirit is the Vietnam War, with Russia playing the part of North Vietnam, and in fact, the Italian invasion of Greece (which, without either British or German intervention, would probably have ended in an Italian victory).
"Instead it seems that if anything substantial changes (except murdering thousands of innocent people) - it would be Russia turning into vassal of China."
A more accurate assessment of the situation is a shift of Russian trade and investment away from the rich world and toward middle income countries, of which China is the most important -a phenomenon the rich countries themselves have certainly not been free from over the past thirty years. China does not and can never control Russia's internal policies, and I doubt it has any intention of doing so. Every African leader I have heard, from Museveni to Kagame to Obiang has stated that one of the primary reasons they like working with China is that China makes no demands of them, unlike the U.S./Britain/France.
"I wonder are you actually believing it."
I do. Imagine every American who approved of Russia's intervention (a demographic which, ironically enough, is skewed toward rich young college-educated men) left the country. Who among the remainder would miss them?
"Heh, because Putin's loyalists are so brave, efficient and incorruptible patriots :)"
They're not dead-enders by definition. They're the silent majority. The share of Russians saying their country is going in the right direction reached a record high in March. By definition, anyone who leaves Russia under such circumstances is a fair-weather friend at best. And we have seen the results of reliance on such fair-weather friends time and time again.
"Well, it is becoming plausible that Europe will cut dependence on energy imports from Russia and start treating it as a military danger."
A very important long-term shift, certainly, but impossible in the short term. Neither Europe nor Russia can plausibly adjust to a short-term energy decoupling. Both can very plausibly adjust to a medium or a long-term one.
"Are you really predicting that Ukrainians will start liking (or at least stop their deep dislike of Russia) any time soon?"
Well, it strongly depends on what Russia does. We'll see. A limiting of the operation to Donbass is by far the most likely option to heighten such hatred to a boiling point for the longest time.
I must say that I sometimes encounter dumb takes from Western/Ukrainian propaganda and I am becoming interested into some alternative viewpoint.
And then I encounter some Z-brandishing idiot who convinces me that average Russian manages to be apparently be misinformed than average person commenting on Reddit/Twitter/FB.
> Really? Is a month and a half post-invasion "long term"?
Are you really predicting that Ukrainians will start liking (or at least stop their deep dislike of Russia) any time soon?
> Also, given the strength of Ukrainian resistance, Ukraine clearly already was a long-term enemy for Russia.
Are you really claiming that murdering thousands and bombing their cities had no substantial impact on their opinion of Russia?
> Once again: here's the issue the anti-invasion wimps never address: how should Russia have addressed the Ukraine question?
Give up its pretension to being a superpower and recognize that they are in similar position to UK and France, if that.
Or resolve it peacefully.
Or at least prepare invasion that is not some parody of Gulf War.
Or scale plans to match military abilities.
Instead it seems that if anything substantial changes (except murdering thousands of innocent people) - it would be Russia turning into vassal of China.
> frankly, those who leave Russia at this time, when Putin's approval rating approaches 80%, are traitors who never could have productively contributed to the country
This is hilarious. I wonder are you actually believing it.
Heh, because Putin's loyalists are so brave, efficient and incorruptible patriots :)
(And on other side: expecting people to be heroes and self-sacrifice in attempt to stop russian government is asking way too much)
> If it ever could be isolated, it already was.
Well, it is becoming plausible that Europe will cut dependence on energy imports from Russia and start treating it as a military danger.
@eharding I think your initial question ("how should Russia have addressed the Ukraine question?") is a good one and is one angle I was hoping people would get at in betting/responding to this market. I'm not sure I agree with all of what's posted in the twitter thread, but your rebuttals seem overconfident to me.
Once again: here's the issue the anti-invasion wimps never address: how should Russia have addressed the Ukraine question?
"but he has made it permanently worse for himself/Russia by turning the country and its people into a long-term enemy for Russia."
Really? Is a month and a half post-invasion "long term"? In whose book? Also, given the strength of Ukrainian resistance, Ukraine clearly already was a long-term enemy for Russia.
"Russiaโs economy, under the weight of sanctions and isolation by many Western companies, will remain a basket case for years."
No, it won't.
"Under increased authoritarianism, brain drain (or flood) of talent will continue"
What would have made it disappear? That's a twenty-year long project, not one that can easily be fixed. And, frankly, those who leave Russia at this time, when Putin's approval rating approaches 80%, are traitors who never could have productively contributed to the country.
"production in their oil/gas fields in Siberia and the Arctic will suffer greatly over time"
"The country that gets America into space can't get into tech".
"Russia will be isolated for years"
If it ever could be isolated, it already was.
https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1507801526500212738
One month into Russiaโs war on Ukraine, it is worth stepping back and taking stock of the geopolitical results for Russia thus far ๐งต
Putin launched the war as an effort to once and for all 'resolve' his Ukraine problem (its pro-Western orientation), reassert Russia's greatness on the world stage and firm up control of the post-Soviet space: send a message to everyone that flirtations with EU/NATO are dangerous
Itโs very clear now that the decision to launch the war was Putin's and his alone. And that decision, as well as the utter incompetence with which it had been prosecuted, ended up being a complete disaster for the Russian state
By not being able to take Kyiv and replace Zelenskyโs government with a pro-Russian puppet regime, he has not been able to achieve his aims of bringing Ukraine back into Russiaโs sphere of influence
Quite the opposite. By valiantly withstanding his military assault, Ukraine has won the ability to remain squarely pro-Western in its geopolitical orientation
Ukraine may or may not be given the right to join NATO or the EU, but it will certainly continue to get supplies of lethal Western weaponry and economic aid, which will allow it to rapidly rebuild its military, thus thwarting Russiaโs goals of demilitarizing the country
Thus, not only has Putin NOT solved his โUkraine problemโ, but he has made it permanently worse for himself/Russia by turning the country and its people into a long-term enemy for Russia. And he has paid an enormous price for that miscalculation
Russiaโs economy, under the weight of sanctions and isolation by many Western companies, will remain a basket case for years. His ability to procure semiconductors vital for commercial and military industries is now highly limited. His banks are isolated in global finance
Russiaโs ability to raise debt for growth from Western sources will be very limited and China will not be a complete substitute for that loss. Under increased authoritarianism, brain drain (or flood) of talent will continue, hampering Russiaโs long-term growth prospects
If Western oilfield services companies (Halliburton, Baker Hughes and Schlumberger) with their high-end technical know-how continue to stay away from new contracts in Russia, production in their oil/gas fields in Siberia and the Arctic will suffer greatly over time
So Russiaโs long-term prospects for the huge source of gov revenue (petrochemical exports) are bleak. And all hopes of diversifying economy with other sources of revenue can now be kissed goodbye. Even military exports are now in doubt if they struggle to produce high-end weapons
Under the weight of these economic impediments, Russia ability to quickly reconstitute their military losses in Ukraine and continue investing in advanced weaponry will be highly challenged, further diminishing its global power projection abilities
Diplomatically, due to this aggression and war crimes committed in Ukraine, Russia will be isolated for years. It will not be complete isolation since plenty of countries (China, India, Pakistan, Brazil) will continue to work with them but RUโs reputation has taken a huge blow
And what does Putin have to show for all this pain?
Bombed out Mariupol, a bridge to Crimea and MAYBE (still a big question) all of Donbas given to DNR/LNR? Few in Russia cared much about any of these issues pre Feb 24
Putin will try to spin these gains as a victory but it is undoubtedly a huge strategic loss for Russia and himself personally
Eharding blog posts linked above seem extrasilly, like denying that NATO has any deterrent role.
"NATO is a purely defensive alliance." is a dumb take that manages to ignore many events and treat propaganda as true. But "NATO is a purely offensive alliance." is even worse take. Claiming that invading Estonia is not made harder by fact that it is in NATO is ridiculous.
I believe no. The fundamental reasons I've explicated here still hold (though Ukrainian will to resist was obviously higher and, more crucially, Russian military capability was obviously lower than I expected). Though this invasion has not (yet) been a win for Russia, it has been a major loss for the West.
https://eharding.substack.com/p/the-case-for-russia-invading-ukraine?s=w
https://eharding.substack.com/p/problem?s=w
minor nit on
> will the invasion be regarded *by the west* as a mistake *from the perspective of Russian imperial power*
it would need to meet the bar of "major strategic blunder" or "major mistake", which is higher than just a "mistake" but lower than "catastrophic mistake". not sure how best to quantify or make more explicit but feel free to ask for more clarification.
> Yeah, I think that's already the case and will continue to be so.
I think I agree that it's currently the case, but I guess I'm not quite at 95%+ that it will continue to be so.
For example, this from before still seems true:
> For example, let's say UKR leadership and most major cities fall in the next few weeks + RU is able to navigate the financial/social crises reasonably well through April and May + diplomatic pressure leads to some/many of the international sanctions weakening (or being on a path to weakening by the end of the year). In this scenario, a ~month long invasion that accomplished the strategic objective of replacing the UKR government and ending the possibility of UKR ever joining NATO would not be a "major strategic blunder", particularly given analyses like https://patrickfox.substack.com/p/the-russian-window argue it was a forced, "now or never" decision.
re:
> Stuff like German re-armament isn't going to reverse regardless of how the rest of the war goes.
I probably wouldn't put my own confidence in that at 95%+ (maybe ~90%?), although I'm not sure June 2022 is far enough into the future to see a meaningful slowdown or partial reversal. The dialing back of sanctions does seem like it would be more noticeable on a June 2022 timeline, though, either directly or through loopholes & lack of enforcement or as a part of peace negotiations.
I'm also curious as to the resolution criteria for this one. Do you mean a blunder from the perspective of Russia as a country? Or Putin personally? While there are certainly many who think the invasion has already turned out to be a mistake, there are also many who fear that Putin will actually achieve his personal goals. I'm pretty sure the war will turn out to be a bad decision for the average Russian, but for Putin himself? I think 90% is way too high.
@Andy, very curious as to your criteria for resolving this. There are definitely a number of voices prominent in western media already saying it was a strategic blunder, and I'm seeing very few saying the opposite. Even if Putin gets a "best case" for him scenario and topples the Ukrainian government, the West is almost certainly going to stay united against him in a serious way (vs the fairly toothless protestations after his previous acts of aggression in Eastern Europe). Stuff like German re-armament isn't going to reverse regardless of how the rest of the war goes.
Some more info: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/03/putin-nato-finland-sweden-support-ukraine/626965/
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